CONTENDING IDEOLOGIES: LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM

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The collapse of the Soviet Union signaled the triumph of liberal democracy. But 9/11 brought home the terrorism of religious fundamentalism. Hence, liberal democracy and religious fundamentalism have become the contending ideologies in today's global village. The paper presents an interpretation of the crisis of liberalism (and especially its corrosive individualism, market fundamentalism and its politics of wealth and power) that has resulted in the backlash of religious fundamentalism. Then the threat of religious fundamentalism, especially of radical Islam, is analyzed: its nihilistic violence and its intent to impose religious totalitarianism. The conclusion points out the challenge religious fundamentalism poses and the response liberal democracy has to make.

Two articles, whose titles both end with a question mark, marked the end of the Cold War and tried to anticipate the main opportunity and the central danger respectively for the new millennium: Francis Fukuyama's (1989) "The End of History?" and Samuel Huntington's (1993) "The Clash of Civilizations?," both of which have been expanded into books (Fukuyama 1992; Huntington 1996).

With the implosion of the Soviet Union, Francis Fukuyama (1989) declared "the end of history," history not as the chronological unfolding and progression of events, but history as the locus of the clash of ideologies. The end of the Soviet Union marked the ultimate transformation of world politics with the triumph of liberal democracy. Liberal democracy, therefore, constitutes the "end point of mankind's ideological evolution" and the "final form of human government," thus the end of history. Henceforth, chronological history means the inevitable march and spread of liberal democracy.

Samuel Huntington demurred. He predicted that global conflict would no longer be between economic structures, or political systems, or ideological foes. He foresaw that the battle lines would be drawn between civilizations, understood as the largest human groupings characterized by

a common religion and culture. He identified eight major civilizations whose interactions will shape the world. "The underlying problem for the West," Huntington (1996: 217-18) concluded, "is Islam, a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power." Thus, religion and culture will become the most potent factors in history and geopolitics. The future will be a clash of civilizations.

The resounding explosion of 9/11 toppled the twin towers of the World Trade Center, and was feared to usher in not the end of history but the clash of civilizations. Islam had emerged way back in the 1970s in the politics and headlines of the Middle East. But 9/11 exploded into and shocked Western consciousness with the realization that fundamentalist religion could have such a devastating impact on world politics. Religious fundamentalism of which political Islam is a variant, though not "a coherent ideological alternative" (Ruthven 2004: v), thus becomes a contending ideology to liberal democracy.

The paper delineates the contours of these two contending ideologies. First, liberal democracy is critiqued for what it has become: its exaltation of the unencumbered self, its hostility towards religion, its market economy of inequality and waste, its culture of consumerism and exploitation, its subversion by capitalist wealth and power. Liberal democracy has become less attractive to the peoples of the Third World. Second, the crisis of liberal democracy has helped spur the phoenix-like resurgence of religious fundamentalism, which is now its main contending ideology. Islamic fundamentalism was especially abetted by the history of deceptions and betrayals, of manipulation and exploitation that Western liberal democracies have perpetrated on the Middle East. But religious totalitarianism, exemplified in radical Islam, is a threat to human freedom, and must be opposed. Third, religious totalitarianism cannot be defeated by force of arms alone. Liberal democracy must put its house in order. It must be a more just economic order and a fairer political system. It must offer a more meaningful alternative, a better way of life. It must once more deal with the profound human issues of human dignity and justice, of human liberty, equality, and fraternity.[1]

Liberal Democracy

Liberalism

What exactly is liberal democracy? In liberal democracy, democracy is not the first idea, nor even the most basic one. Liberalism is. The Magna Carta comes first, before political parties, right of suffrage, and electoral politics. The Bill of Rights cannot be overridden by majority rule nor in democratic elections nor through referenda. Liberalism says that there are rights of the

individual that are inalienable, that therefore the government cannot infringe upon, that even the majority cannot abrogate.

The story is told that when the Constitutional Convention of 1787 convened in Philadelphia, Thomas Jefferson was serving as U.S. Ambassador to France so that James Madison stood as his alter ego. Madison then sent a copy of the newly drafted Constitution to Jefferson, expecting that the latter would be happy with the result of the convention. Instead, Jefferson wrote back that the Constitution did not protect enough the individual, his rights and his freedoms. During the first Congress, largely through the efforts of Madison, the Constitution was amended ten times, and the Bill of Rights was adopted in December of 1791.

Liberalism has a tangled history of interpretations and evaluations. But the foundation of liberalism rests on the dignity and sovereignty of the individual, his rights and freedoms. The liberal infrastructure includes, among other Enlightenment values, reliance on reason and science, universalism, equality, religious liberty, separation of church and state, and progress. Among the classical liberal manifestos, the Declaration of Independence extolled life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, while the French Revolution proclaimed liberty, equality, and fraternity.

Robert Dahl (2002) asks: How democratic is the American Constitution? He demonstrates that our Constitution came to incorporate anti-democratic elements. Due to the historical context in which it was conceived, it approved of slavery, gave the right of suffrage only to men of property, denied the equal status of women. These have been corrected, but there continue to be elements that are non-democratic, such as, the federal system, the bicameral legislature, judicial review, presidentialism, and the electoral college system. It can be argued, however, that some of these elements, while potentially anti-democratic, defend, protect, and promote liberal values. Judicial review passes final judgment on legislative acts that can trample on the rights of minorities. The federal system dismantled the structures of segregation in the south which were for too long protected by state laws.

With the United States being the sole superpower today, there is much talk and acceptance of the United States as an empire. It used to be that the appellation of empire was used by the left to criticize the foreign policy of the United States. Now the right glories in the nomenclature as signifying the triumph and power of the United States. The United States is often compared with the Roman Empire in that the United States much like the Roman Empire holds overwhelming economic, political, and military power. William Odom and Robert Dujarric (2004) discuss the different dimensions of American imperial might. It is an empire that the United States has inadvertently become, they say. It is moreover a different kind of empire because, they are confident, it is a liberal empire, however an

oxymoron that sounds. It is an empire much like the U. S. liberal democracy that is founded on the liberal values of human dignity and rights, human freedom and equality. It is a benign and progressive empire. One hopes so, while doubting so (see, e.g., Johnson 2004, Bello 2005, Merry 2005).

Our democracy is not simply democracy. It is a liberal democracy. It is built upon the foundations of liberal values. That is why Fareed Zakaria (1997, 2003) warns that, in our missionary zeal to spread democracy throughout the world as our newly found foreign policy goal in the post-Cold War period, we might be abetting illiberal democracies, governments that come to power through elections but that then exercise their power to violate the rights of individuals, especially of ethnic minorities and women, that deprive citizens of their basic freedoms. It might be easy enough to create political parties and competitive elections, but it is much more difficult to construct the liberal foundations on which to erect liberal democracies. Absent such constitutional liberal infrastructures in many countries of the developing world, we have the strange creature of an elected autocrat who comes to power through one man, one vote, once.

Liberalism, therefore, is contrasted with conservatism whose bedrock values are order, authority, tradition, hierarchy, and community, which tends to favor stability over change, is hostile toward radical reform, and condemns the excesses of individualism and egalitarianism. But liberalism has also undergone change. New Deal liberalism is political liberalism that affirmed the positive role of government in trying to solve the economic ills of the Great Depression, in fighting Fascism and Nazism during the Second World War, and later on in ending racial segregation and promoting the equality of minorities, including women. Neoliberalism is economic liberalism that extols and promotes the efficiency of unfettered markets as capitalism spreads across borderless economies of the globe.

Democracy

Democracy, in the famous formulation of Abraham Lincoln, is a government of the people, by the people, and for the people. Substantive democracy–the classic doctrine of democracy–is "that institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions which realizes the common good by making the people itself decide issues through the election of officials who are to assemble in order to carry out its will" (Schumpeter 1975: 250). It presupposes that the people have a consensus on the common good, that they have reached agreement on what constitutes the common weal, that there is a common conception of what is good and bad, what is right and wrong. The problem is that in a country like the United States where pluralism reigns, there is no common conception of and consensus on the common good. Democracy, therefore, has become procedural; we

are a procedural republic with no public philosophy or, at least, in search of a public philosophy (Sandel 1996). Procedures have become the means to public peace. Democracy, in other words, is understood and practiced primarily as the pursuit of an open and competitive system of governance based on rules acceptable to all. It is democracy as Joseph Schumpeter (1975: 269-302) laid down as an alternative theory to the classical doctrine of democracy; it is simply electoral democracy. Its legitimacy arises from the fact that it has gained majority rule in a competitive election in which people exercise their right of suffrage.

One big deficiency of electoral democracy is that it ignores the realities of power and wealth. It assumes that since the electoral race is based on neutral rules, the playing field is level. It is true, as Charles Lindblom (1977) had pointed out, that business has a "privileged position" in a democratic government, because government is dependent on businesses for economic growth, for jobs and wages of the population, on which in turn the continuing hold on power of an elected government depends. But it is evident today in the United States that both Democratic and Republican Parties, more so the latter than the former, have become beholden to corporate interests for the monetary largesse they make available in campaigns and elections. Campaigns and elections have become enormously expensive. Rich individuals and wealthy corporations have come to play an overwhelmingly dominant role in electoral democracy, and they in turn are the main beneficiaries of the legislative process, especially in the form of tax cuts. In the process, wealth and power have subverted and betrayed democracy (Greider 1992). Even the U.S. Supreme Court in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) has acquiesced to the electoral politics of moneyed interests by invalidating campaign expenditure limits as violations of the First Amendment. Democracy is one person, one vote. With power and wealth, it has become one dollar, one vote. Thus, electoral democracy is fast becoming, if it is not yet already, a government of, by, and for the rich and powerful, corporations and individuals.

Electoral democracy, embedded in the classic liberal foundations that protect individuals, posits the state and/or the market as the institutional means of promoting the dignity and rights of individuals. Under Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the New Deal, the state became the dominant institutional means of recovering from the Great Depression and of prosecuting the war against Fascism and Nazism. The Great Society of Lyndon Baines Johnson used the state to extend equal rights for women and minorities who for long were discriminated against and disenfranchised. This came to be known as welfare state liberal democracy. With the economic "stagflation" of the late 1970s, confidence in the instrumentality of the state began to wane. With the election of

Ronald Reagan in the United States and of Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain, the institutional means of the market came to the fore.

The problem with the market, however, is that it reduces everything to commodities that could be bought and sold. It knows no value except price as determined by supply and demand. The market therefore aggravates the inequalities of procedural democracy, opening it further to the highest bidders. There is much talk today of the compatibility between capitalism and democracy in that both are founded on and promote freedom. But there is a greater incompatibility between them in that democracy presupposes and is based on the equality of citizens, while capitalism and the market build upon and promote the inequality between people. Historically, democracy was used to tame the cruelty and excesses of capitalism, whereas today capitalism manipulates the procedures and processes of democracy for its own ends.

John Paul II (1991: 46; see also Weigel 1999), leader of the institution that has moved in the past century and a half from outright opposition to the rights and freedoms championed by liberalism to one of the leading advocates of human rights, religious liberty, and democracy on the world stage, had this to say after the "velvet revolution" of Eastern Europe as democracy swept across the former colonies of the Soviet Union:

> Nowadays there is a tendency to claim that agnosticism and skeptical relativism are the philosophy and basic attitude which correspond to democratic forms of political life. Those who are convinced that they know the truth and firmly adhere to it are considered unreliable from a democratic point of view, since they do not accept that truth is determined by the majority, or that it is subject to variation according to different political trends. It must be observed in this regard that if there is no ultimate truth to guide and direct political activity, then ideas and convictions can easily be manipulated for reasons of power. As history demonstrates, a democracy without values easily turns into open or thinly disguised totalitarianism.

The statement became controversial because it was understood to subvert the neutral rules of the procedural republic. But it is well to remember that Weimar democracy through a series of pragmatic bargains granted Hitler and his Nazi Party the legal tolerance and the democratic tools with which they eventually toppled it. Thus Goebbels: "It will remain forever one of the biggest jokes of the history of democracy that she herself supplied the weapons with which she was brought down." However difficult it is to have one's voice heard in the public square, however contentious discussions and debates on values are, in whatever shape civic society and civic culture will assume or be transformed, nobody can be blind to the crisis of American procedural democracy. "America is caught," Charles Noble (2004: 27) puts it, "in a downward spiral of alienation from government and cynicism about politics." Democracy cannot simply be a

free-floating process; it has to be tethered to certain basic truths and values about the human person and the common good. Otherwise, democracy is up for grabs for power and wealth to capture.

Third World countries increasingly see American democracy as problematic as Americans themselves regard it. As Pinkney (2003: 224) observed:

> Democratic aspirations in the West had changed by the late twentieth century. Voters were less inclined to judge governments by their ability to provide generous social welfare and full employment, as these objectives were deemed to be impracticable or undesirable. Sexual, racial, and religious equality had become more important, but not social equality or the ability of elected governments to control the economy in the perceived public interest. Individual and communal participation in politics had declined, and much of the gap was filled by corporate sponsorship. Where this has not involved outright corruption, it has made politicians subservient to business interests. As societies became more nonegalitarian and fragmented, crime and terrorism grew, and this raised questions about the balance between civil liberties and public order. In many respects Western liberal democracy became more liberal but less democratic. There were fewer restrictions on drinking, gambling, divorce, abortion, homosexuality, and even drug taking, but governments increasingly insisted that the public sector should retreat, leaving more decisions in the hands of private individuals, private business, and the voluntary sector.

The United States finds itself, therefore, in an awkward position, promoting with missionary and military zeal democracy while half of its citizens are alienated from it. The 2000 presidential elections showed the entire world the lengths to which U.S. electoral democracy can be manipulated even by the supposedly supreme judicial powers-that-be of the land. The devastation wrought by hurricane Katrina exposed the deep social inequality that has built up from the foundations of American democracy throughout the conservative resurgence from Nixon to the present (Hodgson 2004). For the very same reasons, Third World countries now find less appeal in democracy, although they do adopt the nominal, empty, and formal trappings of democracy for the sake of remaining acceptable members of the international community where democracy is the current coinage.

Liberalism and Religion

Classic liberalism and, therefore, liberal democracy have the most difficulty with religion. It is not surprising since the greatest foes of liberalism were an absolutist state and an absolutist church. The words of the atheist French priest Jean Meslier (1664-1729), oftentimes attributed to Diderot or Voltaire – "Man will never be free until the last king is strangled with the entrails of the last priest"–capture liberalism's animosity.

John Courtney Murray, Jesuit theologian of religious liberty at Vatican II, carefully distinguished two liberalisms: Continental and Anglo-Saxon. Continental liberalism is found in Western Europe, the original site of the absolutisms of state and church against which the Enlightenment and the French Revolution struggled. It is marked by hatred of and hostility to religion. Its goal, therefore, is a completely secular society. Anglo-Saxon liberalism has a more benevolent attitude towards religion. The first amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids the establishment of religion at the same time that it allows its free exercise. The founding fathers were men of religious conviction, albeit of the deist kind. The American people as a whole hold deeply religious beliefs which they do not find incompatible with the classic liberal values of human dignity and human liberty.

Thomas Jefferson asked rhetorically: "Can the liberties of a nation be thought secure when we have removed their only firm basis, a conviction in the minds of the people that these liberties are the gift of God?" At the same time he was aware and explicitly recognized the passions that could be inflamed by religious differences and debates. Jefferson's compromise was: "Citizens of a Jeffersonian democracy can be as religious or irreligious as they please as long as they are not 'fanatical.'" And what is required for a religious believer not to be fanatical is to keep his religion a private matter (Owen 2001: 90-95). Liberalism's solution to its difficulties with religion is to remove religion from the public domain, to privatize it. Thus, the principle of the separation of church and state, with the state exercising neutrality and tolerance in religious matters.

The sociologist Talcott Parsons proffers a more general explanation of the diminished role of religion in modernization. In traditional society which is relatively undifferentiated and unspecialized, a consensus on values, usually provided by a common culture and religion, binds the society together. As society modernizes, society also undergoes structural differentiation and functional specialization, cultural diversity and religious pluralism. In such a situation, it is harder for the value system to encompass and bind society. The value system of the society as a whole must undergo change, and the change requires that the value system must be "couched at a higher level of generality in order to legitimize the wider variety of goals and functions of its subunits" (Parsons 1966: 23). In other words, structural differentiation, functional specialization, cultural diversity, and religious pluralism require cultural secularization, procedural justice, formal rationality a la Max Weber.

John Courtney Murray (1960: 45-78; Curran 2002: 227-29), however, held that the doctrine of religious freedom and its companion-doctrine of the separation of church and state of Anglo-Saxon liberalism do not eliminate the role of religion in public life and do not silence the public

voice of religion. He posits first of all that the first two articles of the First Amendment are not articles of faith, but are articles of peace. They are articles of peace that would safeguard the civil unity of a pluralist society, at the same time that they protect the religious integrity of many faiths. The roles of the state and of the church in constitutional liberalism are governed by a number of distinctions: between the sacred and secular orders of human existence; between society and state; between the common good and the public order.

First, the separation of church and state builds on the distinction of the sacred and secular orders, the spiritual and temporal orders, and the two realms cannot be confused. The link between spiritual and temporal, between church and state is the person who is both a Christian and a citizen. Through the mediation of the conscience of the Christian citizen, the spiritual has repercussions on the temporal. Second, the purposes of the state are not coextensive with the purposes of society. The state has a limited role in civil society, exercising its coercive power and limiting freedom for the benefit of society. The constitutional situation in the United States allows a public role for the Church in society; it can speak out on issues and try to influence aspects of life in society. Third, the common good is the end and purpose of society, while the public order is the end and purpose of the state. The common good devolves upon all members and institutions of society, including churches. The role of the coercive power of the state is to protect and promote public order. Public order involves three goods: justice, public peace, and public morality. Murray's fourth principle, therefore, was: Let there be as much freedom, personal and social, as possible for the common good; let there be as much restraint and constraint as necessary for the public order.

Liberalism in Crisis

Liberalism today faces formidable theoretical challenges so that there is even mention of the crisis of liberalism (see, e.g., Wolfe 2002). There are also criticisms of liberalism and liberal democracy in the way they have been transformed and in the consequences for social life that they have produced. John Courtney Murray, for example, already detected a trend in the early 1950s in which the original principles of American constitutionalism were beginning to be abandoned in favor of a stringent separation of church and state justified by a theory of doctrinaire liberalism. The substance of the American proposition was being evacuated and replaced with empty tolerance: an agreement to disagree (Komonchak 1994: 91-95).

Since then the chorus of complaints has only increased. Richard John Neuhaus (1986) decried "the naked public square." Stephen Carter (1993) argued that the privatization of religions means its trivialization. The

"unencumbered self" of classical liberalism, severed from social ties of family, community, and religion, whose predominant power is the ability to choose, especially comes under attack. Bellah and associates (1996, 1991) reported that the instrumental individualism that had made for the initiative, creativity, self-reliance, and self-confidence of individuals has been transformed into expressive individualism in which individuals do as they please, act because it makes them feel good, behave without a care in the world. Such expressive individualism subverts commitment and community, is especially subversive of good institutions that make for the good society and that enable individuals to be good persons. The only value is tolerance and the sole virtue is sincerity. Even neoliberalism, the ideology of an unfettered market that is propelling globalization, is encountering resistance as it steamrolls societies and cultures especially of the developing world (see, e.g., Richardson 2001; Oxhorn and Ducatenzeiler 1998).

The 2004 presidential elections in which "values" seemed to figure significantly among the electorate–whatever spins the right or the left tried to give it–is one indication of the unease with the actual workings of liberalism. The ascendancy of conservatism and neoconservatism in American politics (Hodgson 2004; Micklethwait and Wooldridge 2004) and the capture of the Republican Party by the religious right (Danforth 2005) mark the declining political fortunes of liberalism. Put succinctly, liberalism is experiencing a backlash, especially from religious fundamentalism which has risen phoenix-like from the ashes of the Scopes trial.

Underlying all this is that, Gregory Baum (2005: 11, 140) reminds us, Enlightenment modernity has a sinister side: "the new individualism, the eager promotion of self-interest, the maximization of utility, the priority assigned to competition, the dedication to consumerism, the commodification of sexuality, the indifference to social justice, the absence of a transcendent ethic and the waning of faith in God." While liberalism has promoted *liberte* and *egalite*, it has betrayed *fraternite* or solidarity.

The Frankfurt School of Critical Theory that started way back in the 1920s had already subjected Enlightenment modernity to a comprehensive critique that is worthwhile retrieving (see Jay 1973). The Frankfurt School offered a passionate defense of the Enlightenment's ethical achievement, especially one that resulted in the human rights tradition. But Critical Theory denounced the abandonment of substantive reason which is concerned with ends and the reliance on instrumental reason which is interested only in means. For example, science and technology are important, but they have no ethical content, are blind to transcendent values, do not reflect on the meaning of liberty, equality, and fraternity. Enlightenment instrumental rationality has reduced human beings to a

collection of objects to be manipulated by techno-scientific reason which has become an instrument of domination. The Holocaust, for one, was not a regression to premodern barbarity, but a historical manifestation of techno-scientific control over people, in this case eliminating them according to the wishes of the powerful. Thus, the Frankfurt philosophers concluded, the Enlightenment has become the greatest obstacle to the emancipation of humanity.

Put quite simply, Enlightenment reason which is the guiding light of liberal democracy has become blind to and dismissive of religion. It is no wonder that it now faces a formidable enemy in faith, in the guise of religious fundamentalism, especially of radical Islam, which is deaf and hostile to reason.

Religious Fundamentalism

Fundamentalism

The term, "fundamentalism," originally referred to the conservative evangelical Christian manifesto, published in twelve volumes beginning in 1910, and titled *The Fundamentals.* In an effort to combat what was perceived to be the increasing secularism of American society and the creeping liberalism within the churches, exemplified by the development of a form of biblical scholarship known as "higher criticism," *The Fundamentals* exposited five central doctrines and an additional four one must accept and believe to be a Christian. The five central doctrines were: the verbal and inerrant inspiration of the bible, the virgin birth of Jesus Christ, the substitutionary atonement of Jesus Christ (Jesus taking the punishment for sin in people's place, in contrast to exemplary atonement), the bodily resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, and the imminent second coming of Jesus Christ. The four related tenets were: the deity of Jesus Christ, the sinful nature of humanity, salvation by faith through the free grace of God, the expectation of the bodily resurrection of true believers on the Last Day.

Since then there have appeared similar movements in all religions, all of which, because of family resemblances, could be conveniently covered by the single term, fundamentalism (Marty and Appleby 1991). In varying degrees, religious fundamentalisms share four ideological characteristics and four organizational features (Almond, Sivan, and Appleby 1995). The four ideological features are: (1) absolutism and inerrancy, i.e., the absolute validity of the fundamentals of religious tradition because they are verbally and literally inerrant; they are free from error because they have been inspired/dictated by God; the religious scriptures, therefore, must be literally understood and cannot be subjected to canons of critical rationality or modern hermeneutical principles; (2) selectivity, i.e.,

religious fundamentalists select and reshape particular aspects of their religious traditions, like the Book of Daniel and Revelation, to justify precepts legitimating the political rule of divine law in times of crisis; they select also aspects of modernity to affirm and embrace, as well as, aspects of modernity to oppose and denounce; (3) moral manichaeism or dualistic worldview that sees the world in terms of light and darkness, of white and black with no grays in between; the world outside is contaminated, sinful, doomed, while the world inside–the enclave–is a pure and redeemed remnant; and (4) millennialism and messianism: history will have a miraculous culmination, good will triumph over evil, the reign of justice will terminate history, the last days will be ushered in by the Messiah, the Savior, the hidden Iman.

The four organizational features are: (1) elect/chosen membership: members are divinely called; they are variously called the faithful, the remnant, the last outpost, the Covenant keepers, the witness bearers; which notion of elect promotes solidarity, cohesion, and commitment; (2) sharp boundaries: the other side of the coin of elect membership is the constant theme of separation, of a dividing wall, of sharp boundaries between faithful and infidel, of pure and sinful, of saved and damned, which boundaries are promoted by a distinctive vocabulary, dress code, discipline, and way of life; (3) authoritarianism: the typical form of leadership is charismatic, the leader is endowed with extraordinary qualities, heavenly grace, special access to the deity, deep and complete understanding of sacred texts; there is, therefore, a distance between leader and followers, which deference is illustrated in body language and rituals, like kissing the hand of the leader, touching the hem of his robe; and (4) behavioral requirements: elaborate behavioral requirements create a powerful emotional dimension to religious fundamentalism, like distinctive music and hymnals, rules that regulate sexuality, speech, and dress: long beards for Haredim, trimmed beards for Muslims, knee-length skirts for Sikhs.

But over and above these distinguishing marks, religious fundamentalism is a revolt against the modern age (Lawrence 1990). The modern world or modernity has two aspects: modernization refers to the scientific and technological advances brought about by industrialism, such as radio, television, computers, airplanes, cellphones, while modernism points to the values and attitudes characteristic of modern world rationality, such as freedom, individuality, gender equality, free thought and speech, which often degenerate into license, promiscuity, and immorality. They are the hardware and the software respectively of modernity and the modern world. According to Lawrence (1990: 6), "the single most consistent denominator is opposition to all those individuals and institutions that advocate Enlightenment values and wave the banner

of secularism or modernism.... [N]othing defined the tone of fundamentalist rhetoric as much as hatred, which is also fear, of modernism." Which is to say that fundamentalists are anti-modernist; they are not anti-modern. In fact, fundamentalists are modern; they are not a throwback to traditionalism.

What religious fundamentalisms reject are the individual autonomy, the relativistic flux of values, and the tumultuous maelstrom of experiences characteristic of modernism (Berman 1982). They are especially concerned about the effects of modernist values on women, the family, and the home. The home is the last bastion of religious fundamentalism, and they especially regard as subversive the attack on the role and status of women who are at the heart of the family. At the same time, religious fundamentalists are also products of the modern age, and they are not above, but have become adept in, utilizing the results of modern science and using the means of modern technology to spread their message, to gain converts to their cause, and to realize their goals. Their two-pronged effort is to reject modernist values in private life and to transform public life so the gap between private and public is bridged.

The critical question is: Can you separate modernization from modernism? Or do they come as one package that cannot be unpacked? The history of social thought from Marx and Weber to Berger, Berger, and Kellner (1974) strongly concludes that the hardware and the software of modernity cannot be unpacked and separated. The history of modernizing nations empirically demonstrates that with freedom comes license, with the use of modern technological gadgets comes their abuse, that the marvels of science and technology are double-edged swords to be wielded for good or evil. There is no heaven on earth.

Religion and Modernity

If liberalism has the most difficulty with religion, conversely religion faces its greatest challenge from the Enlightenment values that ushered in the modern age. The Enlightenment is usually referred to as the Age of Reason. But Louis Dupre (2004: xiii) argues that "it was first and foremost a breakthrough in *critical consciousness*." He adds: "Islam never had to go through a prolonged period of critically examining the validity of its spiritual vision, as the West did during the eighteenth century. The doubt and anxiety that accompanied the West's reassessment of its past have marked the rest of the modern age. . . . [I]t permanently inured us against one thing: the willingness to accept authority uncritically. . . . [T]he need to question has advantageously distinguished our culture from others" (Dupre 2004: ix).

The questioning of religious and moral absolutes was the biggest threat religion had to confront from the Enlightenment. Protestantism had

the least difficulty with the task. In fact, Martin Luther's doctrine of the autonomous individual before the sovereign God, his conflict with the despotism of the medieval Church anticipated, if they did not pave the way to, the individualism, freedom, and free inquiry that marked the Enlightenment period. Judaism's confrontation with modernity led to paradigm shifts that resulted in co-existence with modernity of Conservative Judaism, and assimilation to modernity of Liberal, Reform Judaism (Kung 1992). Catholicism's struggle with modernity was prolonged and tumultuous. It was only with the Second Vatican Council (1965-1969) that the Catholic Church made peace with the modern world, accepting the validity of human rights, including religious liberty, and of democracy as the best form of government. In fact, under John Paul II, the Catholic Church engaged in an active and prominent promotion of universal human rights and democracy. There remain, however, fundamentalist resistance and groupings in these religions, as in all religions, increasingly becoming vocal and organized.

Islam has not undergone the critical self-consciousness brought about by the values of the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, and the Democratic Revolution of the modern age. Islam has not subjected its religious scriptures and traditions to the canons of rational inquiry nor to the tenets of historical criticism. One fundamental reason for this is Muslim belief that Allah verbally dictated the Quran to Muhammad in Arabic. Muslims hold that the Quran is the Word of God in the same manner that Christians consider Jesus the Son of God. The Quran is unlike the Hebrew or the Christian Scriptures. The Quran, for Muslims, is a single book promulgated at one time by one man, the Prophet Muhammad. "After a lively debate in the first centuries of Islam," Bernard Lewis (2003: 8) points out, "the doctrine was adopted that the Qur'an itself is uncreated and eternal, divine and immutable. This has become a central tenet of the faith." In Judaism and Christianity, on the other hand, the Mosaic authorship of the Torah and the historicity of the Gospels, for example, were critically questioned and examined and led to new understandings and interpretations.

To be sure, science, medicine, and technology flourished in Muslim societies from the ninth to as late as the sixteenth centuries. "Until the rise of modern science," Ahmad Dallal (1999: 155) notes, "no other civilization engaged as many scientists, produced as many scientific books, nor provided as varied and sustained support for scientific activity." Greek wisdom, especially that of Aristotle, would have been lost, had it not been preserved, commented upon, and transmitted by Muslim scholars (Rubenstein 2003). Thomas Aquinas, the greatest Catholic theologian, studied and cited the Aristotelian commentaries of Ibn Sina (980-1037), the most celebrated Muslim philosopher of all time, and Ibn Rusd (1126-1198),

known in the West as Avicenna and Averroes respectively. But "religion [i.e. Islam] did not play a role in the [scientific] process of transformation," Dallal (1999: 213) also points out. "It neither shaped the cognitive content of the sciences not did it impede their development. The overall outcome of the religious discourse on science was not to subjugate science to religion but to separate the two enterprises. This meant that the criteria of one were not to be used to judge the other. . . . In many ways science in the Muslim world was a secular enterprise, and religion neither made an enemy of science not championed its cause to the extreme." Neither did science, therefore, raise questions about the received traditions of Islam nor did it lead to a critical self-consciousness about their inerrant and literal understandings.

In the West, on the other hand, religion was threatened by science and got entangled in scientific disputes. In the conflicts and struggles to reconcile and separate science from religion, Western thinking was set on a path that led to critical self- consciousness and evaluation of the very literal and historical premises of religion. Put differently, religion was challenged by the values, orientations, and attitudes that came with modernity, and was put in/found its own proper place and competence.

Herein lies the crisis facing Islam, its increasingly dogmatic rejection of modernity and the West, the embodiment of modernity (Lewis 2003). This is what is the trouble with Islam today, the loss of the tradition of *ijtihad* or independent thinking (Manji 2003). Islam has never undergone its own Reformation, although since the 1970s there has been an Islamic resurgence. In the face of the challenges of modernity and the West, Muslim reformers would like to adopt Enlightenment values, reconcile them with their religious traditions, and institute a separation of church and state. Traditionalists look to the golden age of Islam under the caliphate in the seventh century, would create theocracies where the *sharia* is the law of the land. Fundamentalists, also known as Islamists or *jihadists,* would use violence and terrorism to bring to reality their vision of an Islamic utopia. Thus, a struggle is being waged for the soul of Islam. The outcome of the turmoil on the personal, cultural, theological, and political levels will determine the future of Islam and its relationship with the West.

The questions for Islam and the West, according to John Esposito (1999, 2002) of the Center for Muslim-Christian Understanding at Georgetown University, are: *Whose Islam?* Who interprets, decides, leads, and implements change? *What Islam?* Will it simply be a restoration and repetition of past doctrines and laws? Or will it be a reinterpretation and reformulation of Islam to meet the demands of modern life? At any rate, "the process of Islamic reform is difficult. As in all religions, tradition–centuries-old beliefs and practices–is a powerful force, rooted in the claim of being based on the Quran or the practice (Sunnah) of the Prophet.... A

twofold process of reform, intellectual and institutional, will be required in the face of powerful conservative forces, limited human and financial resources, and a culture of authoritarianism that limits or controls freedom of thought in many countries" (Esposito 2002: 68).

Religious Totalitarianism

Religions that claim to be universal in their nature also claim to have a mandate to spread their religious faiths to every corner of the world, to convert every human being to their religious fold. The religions that have taken these universal claims most seriously are Christianity and Islam. "Christians and Muslims share a common triumphalism. In contrast to the other religions of humanity, including Judaism, they believe that they alone are the recipients and custodians of God's final message to humanity, which is their duty to bring to the rest of the world" (Lewis 2003: 5).

Sadly, however, the universality of these claims has led both Christians and Muslims in their histories to use violence, to wield the sword, to force the conversion of peoples they consider to be unbelievers, and to kill those who would not convert. Religions are especially open to the totalitarian temptation if they become wedded to political power (see Jewett and Lawrence 2003). In this, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam are all guilty in their histories. In this, no religion is superior to another. Every religion has a bloody history.

A brief rundown of the history of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam will suffice to illustrate the above. In the Old Testament or Hebrew Scriptures–Jews call it Tanakh–Yahweh orders Joshua to conquer the land promised to the Chosen People, killing all the inhabitants therein, women and children included. Rereading these passages conjures up modern-day images of ethnic cleansing and terrorism whose most salient feature is the indiscriminate targeting of innocent civilians. A most disturbing story is of Phinehas (Num. 25) who broke into the marriage tent of an Israelite man and his Midianite wife to spear both with one thrust, spurred by his conviction that such intermarriage violated the purity of Israel and had brought about a plague as punishment. "Phinehas came to be viewed as a prototype of faith, the hero of a long and violent succession of zealots" (Jewett and Lawrence 2003: 169).

In 313, Constantine fused religious and political power together so that both cross and sword held the Christian empire together. One result was the disappearance of rival religions from the face of the earth. Jews would also have disappeared were it not for Augustine's injunction: "Let them survive, but do not let them thrive," as a lasting sign of their perfidy as a people (Carroll 2001). The justification for crusades and inquisitions was to convert the nonbeliever and to punish the heretic. "*Deus vult*" – God

wills it–was the battle cry! The Puritans aimed to convert the natives of America, but if they would not convert, the heathen–who were already condemned anyway–would be exterminated. The twin aims of Spain and Portugal were both to colonize and Christianize the Americas and the Philippines. One consequence was the demise of peoples and cultures.

Islam spread across Arabia by horse and scimitar, through death and destruction. In the person of Muhammad, religious authority was conjoined with political authority, which would subsequently be passed on to the office of caliph. With incredible speed, Muslim armies swept through the eastern parts of the Byzantine Empire and through North Africa and Spain. By the eleventh century, religious and political power had brought about three centers of Islamic faith and culture: Cordoba, Cairo, and Baghdad. By 1450, there were three great empires characterized by Muslim culture and held together by Islamic faith and might, the Ottoman of Turkey, the Safavid of Persia, and the Mughal of India.

Two lessons can be learned from this brief historical rundown: first, when you marry religion, especially monotheistic religion, with political power, you can have lethal consequences, because, second, religion with its absolutes, its certainty and certitude, is always subject to the totalitarian temptation. Religion becomes the ultimate legitimation, the "sacred canopy," in Peter Berger's (1969) terms. Leviticus (18: 22) tells me that homosexuality is an abomination, so if I had the political might to do it, why should I not exterminate homosexuals? Utopias, the attempts to create heaven on earth, have not only been the perennial temptation of secular totalitarianisms, but also of religious totalitarianisms.

Religion, like any other human and social reality, is ambiguous. It has its dark and evil side, manifested in crusades, inquisitions, massacres, pogroms, in its religious justification of slavery, racism, patriarchy, and classism. But religion has also its good and beneficent side, attested to by countless prophets, saints, holy men and women in all religions. The problem is not with religion itself. The problem is the political manipulation of religion; it is the use of religion to promote and attain political ends; it is the struggle for political power under the guise and banner of religion. When the template of religious drama is imposed on political conflict, the secular conflict is lifted to the proscenium of a cosmic war, in which everything is at stake and every means is allowed (Juergensmeyer 2004). This is what is happening with radical Islam, an understanding of which requires a historical context.

Radical Islam

With the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during World War I, Arab-Muslim nations came under the colonial rule of Western powers, and like every people under colonialism suffered from oppression and exploitation. With

decolonization after World War II, these newly-independent countries aspired to be like modern Western nations, exemplified by Kemal Ataturk's Turkey. Instead, they got as leaders–the first betrayal–modern Pharaohs, incompetent, corrupt, who kept down their own peoples and countries. The second betrayal came with the dream of pan-Arabism promoted by Egypt's Nasser, which turned out not only to be empty, but to be equally oppressive and exploitative. The third betrayal came with the United States, the beacon of freedom and democracy, who talked the talk but did not walk the walk, in its support of these corrupt autocratic leaders because of oil and in its support of Israel, ignoring its occupation of Palestinian territory. Robert Fisk (2005), in a thousand-page volume, gives an accounting of this history of lies, deceptions, and betrayals. He reveals most pointedly the role of the West in this history of injustice that has condemned the Middle East to war: its support of the most ruthless leaders of the region, and the powerful military presence of the United States, that have evoked the increasingly anti-Western–and particularly anti-American–sentiments among the region's Muslim populations.

With the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran, where America's armed-to-the-teeth surrogate was brought down by a bearded mullah, Islam became an attractive solution to the long-suffering peoples of the Arab-Muslim world. Islam became *the* solution, the socio-political solution, and an Islamic resurgence ensued. It is important to distinguish levels and groups in this Islamic revivalism (see Esposito 1999; Murphy 2002).

First, there is the personal level or "Pious Islam," the groundswell of religious piety and practice among the grassroots, among ordinary Muslims and the professional class. Second, there is the cultural level or "Cultural Islam," the effort to assert a distinctive Islamic identity and culture and to resist what are perceived to be pernicious Western modernist values. Third, there is the theological level or "Thinking Islam," the endeavor of intellectuals to reexamine their theological heritage and traditions with the aim of modernizing and democratizing Islam. Fourth, there is the political level or "Political Islam," the political project to reshape the region's authoritarian secular political order and to redefine Islam's role in the public area. Within "Political Islam," there is an extremist fringe–"Radical Islam" or *Islamism or Jihadism*–which, inspired especially by the writings of the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, opts to use violence and terrorism to achieve their goal of establishing Islamic totalitarianism.

Qutb is considered the ideologue of radical Islam, "the philosopher of Islamic terror" (Berman 2003a). Qutb was a school teacher who was sent by the Egyptian Ministry of Education to study in the United States where most improbably he experienced a religious awakening. He was shocked by the materialism and degeneracy of the American way of life, its

sinfulness and addiction to sexual promiscuity. He observed that even religion in America was affected by the hideous schizophrenia of modern life because religions competed on material terms, and success was measured by size–bigness and numbers. He was also shocked by the sentiments and level of support of Americans for what he saw was a Jewish onslaught on Islam, with therefore Christian complicity.

Qutb saw Western materialism and debauchery as the greatest threat to the Muslim way of life. Modern values and practices infect with their godlessness and amorality. Not only that, but modernity seduces with its profligate, dissolute way of life. It is for the same reason that the Ayatollah Khomeini later on denounced the United States as "the Great Satan." The United States is the pre-eminent source of modernist values and attitudes. The United States seduces with its materialistic and immoral way of life. America, therefore, poses the greatest threat to the kind of Islam Khomeini wished to impose on his fellow Muslims. Bernard Lewis (2003: 81) clarifies: "Satan as depicted in the Qur'an is neither an imperialist nor an exploiter. He is a seducer, 'the insidious tempter who whispers in the hearts of men' (Qur'an CVIV, 4, 5)."

Qutb pinpointed the root cause of the seductive lure of Western degradation in the way women are treated in the United States. Western relationships revolve around impulse, passion, and lust, and women are objects of sexual pleasure. In the essay, "The America I Have Seen" (see Loboda 2004: 13), Qutb describes the way women act in the United States:

> The American girl is well acquainted with her body's seductive capacity. She knows it lies in the face, and in expressive eyes, and thirsty lips. She knows seductiveness lies in the round breasts, the full buttocks, and in the shapely thighs, sleek legs and she knows all this and does not hide it. . . . Then she adds to all this the fetching laugh, the naked looks, and the bold moves, and she does not ignore this for one moment or forget it.

Qutb resurrected the concept of *jahiliyyah* that the Prophet Muhammad used to condemn the paganism of the Arabian society of his time. *Jahiliyyah* encapsulates Qutb's entire critique of all systems of life which he viewed as non-Islamic, the West, the Soviet Union, Nasser's regime, and any government that does not submit to Allah's divine guidance. Similarly, he considered Muslim societies as *jahili* and Muslim leaders as apostates who ignored God's authority over man and his actions. The only option for a true Muslim is complete disengagement from the prevailing *jahili* political order.

One question, therefore, dominated Qutb's life: how to stop the extermination of Islam (Berman 2003b: 92). Qutb counters with the notion of Islam as totality, perhaps his most important concept in Berman's (2003b: 66) opinion, which distinguishes Islam from all other worldviews. Islam is a total way of life and of society. There is no dichotomy between public and private, no separation between church and state. What agitated

Qutb most was the split between sacred and secular, the most profound manifestation of the hideous schizophrenia of modernity. More importantly, Islam as totality can only be grasped and lived in an atmosphere of serious struggle, by someone who is engaged in a ferocious campaign for Islam. The crisis of modern man, therefore, is theological. And the truth of Islam is discovered by hurling oneself into militant effort and shows itself in conflict. The true Muslim must be willing to die a martyr. Toward this new theory of Islamist political action, Qutb authored a thirty-volume interpretation of the Quran, entitled *In the Shade of the Q'uran.*

Consequently, Qutb issued a call for all true Muslims to gather themselves into a vanguard to undertake the renovation of Islam and of civilization all over the world. The ultimate goal is to resurrect the pristine Islamic state, revitalizing the code of Shariah. Berman (2003b: 95) states that Shariah was utopia for Sayyid Qutb. But before Shariah could be established, modern jihad had to be waged. The establishment of an Islamic state is not simply an alternative, but an Islamic imperative, based on God's command. All Muslims must obey. Those who fail to comply, governments or individuals, are *jahiliyyah,* pagans or barbarians like those who lived in the Arabian peninsula before Islam arrived. True Muslims are obliged to wage jihad against these infidels. This was Qutb's revolutionary program (Berman 2003b: 98), for which he was hanged by Nasser in 1966. But "Qutb, in essence, was history's juncture for a fork in the road of modern Islamist dissent. After him, two competing trends would dominate Political Islam in Egypt and other Arab states: one reformist and nonviolent, the other revolutionary and violent" (Murphy 2002: 59).

In the suicide bomber, Qutb's utopia, violence, and morgue would grotesquely blend together. Loboda (2004: 34-35) writes:

> The connection between Qutb's view of martyrdom and the modern problem of suicide bombings is clear. Through his writings, Qutb lifts martyrdom as glorious and blissful victory. Martyrdom becomes the inevitable hope of Islam. Likewise, modern radical Islam views suicide bombings and terrorism, which they believe is pursuant to the victory of Islam, as a glorious type of death. Through death, the Muslim believes that he triumphs and realizes his hope in God.

> In this respect, Sayyid Qutb acted as a model for modern Islamic radicalism. There is no doubt that this man practiced what he preached. He taught Islam from his jail cell and refused to do otherwise, even though it cost him his life. Western civilization must do more than the study of the writings of Sayyid Qutb to understand the threat of modern Islam. The West must also study the face of Qutb as he received his sentence from the Egyptian court. It is reported that when Qutb learned of his fate, a smile appeared across his face. In this smile, Qutb illustrates the greatest danger of radical Islam. Whether by combat, execution, or suicide, death for Islam is a joyous victory in itself.

Challenge and Response

Liberal democracy met its most formidable challenge in the aftermath of World War I which it failed to prevent. The secular totalitarianisms of Nazism and Fascism were defeated in the Second World War by force of arms with the help of another secular totalitarianism, Communism.

Communism could not be defeated simply by force, although proxy wars were waged by the nuclear superpowers at the expense of Third World countries. Together with the doctrines of containment and deterrence, the struggle against Communism took the form of a struggle for the hearts and minds of peoples and nations. It had to be demonstrated that the liberal ideas and values of the West were superior to those of totalitarian Communism in the promotion of justice and human rights and in the creation of free and progressive societies. In the process, the liberal doctrines of the West were themselves subjected to scrutiny and change as they were applied in the treatment of Native Americans, African Americans, women, and other minorities. The United States especially had to realize that it was not only a nation that gave birth to freedom, equality, and democracy; it was also a country that was founded on the genocide of one people and the enslavement of another. There were still injustices to be redressed. The denouement of the long Cold War came only in 1989 with the liberation of Eastern Europe and in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Today, liberal democracy has to contend with the challenge and ideology of religious fundamentalism which has sprouted in all religions and in most countries. In the United States, for example, former Republican Senator and Episcopal Minister John Danforth (2005a) has expressed concern that the religious right has captured the Republican Party, that Republicans have transformed the party into the political arm of conservative Christians, that the party has gone so far in adopting a sectarian agenda that it has become the political extension of a religious movement. Believers in the fictional *Left Behind* series of novels form a powerful constituency within the Christian right coalition, thus American foreign policy now falls under the sway of irrational biblical prophecy dramatizing a future Armageddon. The Reconstruction Movement of Texan economist Gary North and his father-in-law Rousas Rushdoony would establish a theocracy in which every single law of the Old Testament, including slavery, must be put literally into practice. Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson, and the Christian Coalition, while disavowing any theocratic ambitions, do not hesitate to use their political muscle and connections to remake the United States into a Christian America in their own image and likeness (Watson 1999).

But it is in radical Islam that what Karen Armstrong (2000) calls "the battle for God" rages. It is radical Islam that has justified waging religious

terrorism to impose its brand of religious totalitarianism. The only response to such chiliastic nihilism is to wage war against it, to exterminate it root and branch while draining the fertile ground from which its recruits come.

In the long run, however, and for more lasting results, the cosmic battle for God is the battle for the minds and hearts of people. The struggle against extremist religion and radical Islam is a struggle for ideas and values. Western liberal democracies must do their utmost to help moderate and reformist Muslims recover their lost tradition of *ijtihad*, the intellectual endeavor of exerting one's efforts to understand Islamic scriptures by using all relevant sources, as they grapple with the implications of modernity, secularity, liberalism, and democracy for Islam (Murphy 2002: 189-232). One hopeful sign is the reaction of Muslim religious leaders to the London subway bombings. In the aftermath of 9/11, their general response was to insist that Islam had nothing to do with terrorism, that terrorism is a perversion of Islam. In the wake of the London bombings, Muslim leaders are changing their tune, they now accept that terrorism is a poison infecting Islam and that moderate Islam should take responsibility to root it out, rolling out campaigns to persuade Muslims, especially the young, to beware of preachers peddling extremism and terrorism (Goodstein 2005).

Most importantly, liberal democrats must take a long hard look at what they have made of liberalism and democracy. In many liberal quarters, liberalism means a disdain for religion, a disregard of community and family, a diffidence toward moral values and the common good. Among many democratic adherents, elections are all about the most money being poured into campaign chests, about dividing the spoils and booty of electoral victory. Liberal democracy has lost its luster, and now fails to attract. Liberal democracy must wean itself from its infatuation with the atomized and deracinated individual, must wrest itself from captivity to interest groups and corporate interests, and must rid itself of its atavistic adherence to laissez-faire.

More specifically, liberal democracy must have the courage to train a laser light of criticism on the arrogance, hypocrisy, and double-standards of its foreign and global policies: its support of authoritarian allies in the Middle East for the sake of oil, its blindness to Saudi Arabia's sponsorship of intolerant Wahhabi *madrassas* which are responsible for the spread of what is derisively referred to as "Petrol Islam," its complicity in prolonging the Palestinian-Israeli stalemate, its imposition of neoliberal economic policies that have devastated societies and cultures in the Third World, its manipulation of free trade agreements to extract concessions from poor counties while subsiding its own industries, its dismissal of international accords and treaties, simply to enhance its sovereignty in the global village, and the list could go on and on.

I leave it to others to evaluate and pass judgment on the actions taken in the aftermath of 9/11, what lies have been said, what secrets continue to be kept, what egregious actions have been taken under the cover of providing national security and in the name of protecting Americans from terrorism (see, e.g., Danner 2005). I close with the rumination of Paul Berman (2003a: 11):

> It would be nice to think that, in the war against terror, our side, too, speaks of deep philosophical ideas – it would be nice to think that someone is arguing with the terrorists and with the readers of Sayyid Qutb. But here I have my worries. The followers of Qutb speak, in their wild fashion, of enormous human problems, and they urge one another to death and to murder. But the enemies of these people speak of what? The political leaders speak of United Nations resolutions, of unilateralism, of multilateralism, of weapons inspectors, of coercion and non-coercion. This is no answer to the terrorists. The terrorists speak insanely of deep things. The antiterrorists had better speak sanely of equally deep things.

Note

1. This article, therefore, is not a comparative study of the historical trajectories of these two ideologies. It is not about the compatibility or incompatibility of Islam and democracy. It is not about the existence of a liberal tradition in Muslim history. Nor is it about the activities, parties, and movements promoting democracy in the Muslim world. A sampling of this literature is Filali-Ansary (1999), Mernissi (2002), Shadid (2002), Ibrahim (2003, 2004), Nasr (2005). My reservation about this literature on Islam and democracy is that in the efforts of the authors to convince Western readers of the compatibility of Islam with modernization, liberalism, and democracy, they offer no sustained critique of what liberal democracy has become. Nor do they discuss with depth the reasons for and the causes of the emergence and attraction of political and radical Islam. As a consequence, they do not dig deep into their traditions of justice, compassion for the poor, equality, and the importance of faith, family, and community to indicate remedies and alternatives to the deleterious tendencies and corrosive effects already at work in liberal democracy.

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